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Abstract—Recently, several practical attacks raised serious concerns over the security of searchable encryption. The attacks have
brought emphasis on forward privacy, which is the key concept behind solutions to the adaptive leakage-exploiting attacks, and will
very likely to become mandatory in the design of new searchable encryption schemes. For a long time, forward privacy implies
inefficiency and thus most existing searchable encryption schemes do not support it. Very recently, Bost (CCS 2016) showed that
forward privacy can be obtained without inducing a large communication overhead. However, Bost’s scheme is constructed with a
relatively inefficient public key cryptographic primitive, and has a poor I/O performance. Both of the deficiencies significantly hinder the
practical efficiency of the scheme, and prevent it from scaling to large data settings. To address the problems, we first present FAST,
which achieves forward privacy and the same communication efficiency as Bost’s scheme, but uses only symmetric cryptographic
primitives. We then present FASTIO, which retains all good properties of FAST, and further improves I/O efficiency. We implemented
the two schemes and compared their performance with Bost’s scheme. The experiment results show that both our schemes are highly
efficient, and FASTIO achieves a much better scalability due to its optimized I/O.
Index Terms—searchable encryption, symmetric primitives, forward privacy, I/O efficiency.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
S EARCHABLE encryption is perhaps one of the most intensive-ly studied cryptographic primitives. The need for searchable
encryption comes from the surge of Storage-as-a-service, a service
delivery model in which the clients store their data on remote
servers that are managed by external service providers (e.g.
Amazon S3, Microsoft Azure Storage, Google Cloud Storage
etc.). When data storage is outsourced, data privacy becomes a
primary concern because the service providers may not always be
trusted. While conventional encryption can be used to protect the
outsourced data, it does not allow effective retrieval of data by
searching on encrypted data. Searchable encryption was proposed
to solve this problem. In general, searchable encryption schemes
work by generating an encrypted index, which will be outsourced
to the cloud service provider along with the encrypted data. Later
the client can generate search tokens that encrypt certain keywords
and the server can perform a search algorithm using the tokens and
the encrypted index to find matches. In this way, even though data
is stored on and searching is handled by an untrusted server, the
privacy of the data can still be preserved.
Recently, there has been a major concern over the security
of searchable encryption schemes. Since 2012, several attacks [1],
[2], [3] have been devised that allow an untrusted server to recover
the keywords in the client’s search tokens, and in consequence, to
learn a significant amount of information about the outsourced
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encrypted data. These attacks are normally performed by utilizing
information leaked in the searching and updating phase, and they
are pervasive because the information leakage exists inevitably in
any searchable encryption scheme. In the most recent work by
Zhang et al [3], the authors showed a simple yet effective adaptive
attack that can fully reveal the client’s queries by injecting only a
small number (usually less than 100) of files to the encrypted data
store. The result is devastating: not only it enables the server to
learn partial information about the encrypted data, the recovered
keywords can also help the server in other statistical attacks. The
essential idea of the attacks is that the server first crafts a set of
files (each contains certain keywords), then sends the files to the
client and tricks the client into encrypting them. After the client
has encrypted and uploaded the injected files, the server can use
the tokens previously submitted by the clients to search on the
injected files. By knowing which keywords are in each injected file
and observing which files matches the token, the server can deduce
easily which keyword is encrypted in the token. The attacks show
that even seemingly harmless small leakage can be exploited, and
highlight the importance of forward privacy, which requires that
a newly inserted file cannot be linked in anyway with previous
search queries. With forward privacy, the attacks can be prevented.
While forward privacy is not a new concept, most searchable
encryption schemes do not support it. Until recently, forward
private searchable encryption implies prohibitively high commu-
nication cost. There is a trivial way to achieve forward privacy:
when a new file needs to be added, the client downloads all
encrypted files from the server, re-indexes them with the new file
and re-encrypts everything with new keys. This is obviously im-
practical. There were also non-trivial solutions using an oblivious
data storage, e.g. Oblivious RAM (ORAM)[4], [5] or Distributed
Oblivious Data structure (DOD) [6], which hides search patterns
and access patterns from the server. In this approach, the server
cannot observe which files matches the token, therefore cannot
learn anything about the query. Nevertheless, the communication
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cost is still too high unless replying on strong assumptions like
multiple non-colluding servers. One notable work by Chang and
Mitzenmacher [7] achieves forward privacy without using an
oblivious data storage. However, in this scheme the search query
size grows linearly in the number of updates, which means after
the system has run for a period of time, the communication cost
for the search operation will become unacceptably high due to the
ever-growing query size.
In CCS 2016, Bost [8] proposed an efficient forward secure
searchable encryption scheme called Sophos that achieves a low
communication cost. In this scheme, the client keeps a state for
each keyword and evolves the state when updating a file on the
server that contains this keyword. The state is used as an input
when generating the encrypted index for the updated file, which
means the previous token is outdated and cannot be used to match
the new index.The state is kept secret from the server util the client
performs a search, at which point a constant size token is generated
that contains the current state. The token enables the server to
recover all previous states from the current state. By knowing all
states, the server can search through all updates and find matching
files. Sophos uses trapdoor permutation, a public key primitive, for
evolving the state so that the server, who does not know the private
key, cannot predict future states. Thus when new updates come in,
the server learns nothing and forward privacy is achieved.
Although Sophos is more efficient than previous forward
private schemes, there are still two significant deficiencies in the
design. Firstly, the scheme is based on public key cryptography.
It has been showed clearly in Bost’s paper [8] that if the data
is updated frequently, the public key operations become a major
performance bottleneck. It would be ideal if only symmetric
cryptographic primitives are used. Secondly, the search operation
is not I/O efficient. Recently it has been shown that I/O has
become a major bottleneck that prevents searchable encryption
from scaling up to large data [9], [10]. In Sophos, the locality,
a measure of I/O efficiency, of the search operation increases
linearly in the number of updates. The performance of the search
operation is inversely proportional to the locality, which means
search performance will degrade inevitably and eventually become
unacceptably slow after a long run. The author acknowledged this
problem but also argued that the poor locality is a necessary price
paid for forward privacy.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our investigation started from two questions: 1) can we construct
a communication-efficient forward private searchable encryption
scheme using only symmetric key primitives? 2) to what extent
can we optimize the I/O efficiency under the security constraint
imposed by forward privacy? We present positive answers to these
two questions by constructing two new searchable encryption
schemes FAST and FASTIO.
• FAST (Forward privAte Symmetric searchable encrypTion)
is our first attempt to construct a forward private searchable
encryption scheme using only symmetric key primitives. The
design of FAST follows the state-based approach used by
Sophos [8], but with a very different idea. In Sophos, the
states are related by a trapdoor permutation. Since the trapdoor
permutation is a public key primitive, by giving the server only
the public key, the server can generate states backwards, but
not forwards. This strategy however is not valid when using
symmetric key primitives. The idea in FAST is inspired by
singly linked list, a classic data structure. Each update is like
a node in a singly linked list and contains a randomly generated
ephemeral key (encrypted). The key is like the pointer in a list
node that points backwards to the previous node. In FAST, a
new state is generated by encrypting the previous state using
the ephemeral key. Given the current key and the current state,
the server can compute the previous state by decryption. The
decrypted state will help the server to get the previous update
and then the previous key. Iteratively, the server can find all
previous states as well as all previous updates. However, since
the key is randomly generated on-the-fly by the client, by no
means could the server predict the future keys/states. Thus
forward privacy is achieved.
• FASTIO, where IO in the name stands for I/O Optimized. While
FAST is entirely based on symmetric key cryptography which
makes it computationally more efficient, it also results in bad
I/O efficiency. The I/O overhead comes from 1) the ephemeral
keys which is required to be stored on the server, and 2) the fact
that the server is forced to read the index in a very non-local
manner in order to achieve the forward privacy property. At first
glance, the I/O inefficiency seems to be the necessary tradeoff
in exchange for other good properties. However, this is not
exactly the case. It was discovered after a further investigation
that the information leaked in previous queries can actually
be utilized to improve I/O efficiency while keeping all other
properties intact. The key idea in FASTIO is that after each
search query, we can let the server store the result. Since the
search result has already been revealed to the server, saving it
will not leak additional information to the server. By doing so,
when the next search query comes in for the same keyword,
the server does not need to search again from scratch. Instead,
the server only needs to search through the new updates since
the last search and combine the new result with the previous
search query result. In this way, the server needs only the latest
state and does not need to store ephemeral keys anymore. In
addition, the non-local reads are also minimized because the
previous search result can be read continuously and non-local
reads are only needed for searching through the new updates.
While I/O overhead is lowered, all operations can still be based
on symmetric key cryptography, and forward privacy can still
be achieved.
We implemented the two schemes and conducted experi-
ments to measure their performance. The results confirm that our
schemes are more efficient in terms of computation than Sophos,
which is the most efficient forward private searchable encryption
scheme to date. The results also confirm that FASTIO has a much
better I/O efficiency, which makes its much more scalable.
2 RELATED WORK
Searchable encryption The functionality of secure search can
be realized by using generic cryptographic primitives such as
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [11], Oblivious RAM
(ORAM)[12], [13] and Secure Multi-Party Computation(SMPC)
[14], [15]. With the generic primitives, it is possible to perfor-
m secure search with minimum information leakage. However,
searchable encryption based on generic primitives are inefficient
and are not suitable to used in practice. Research in practical
searchable encryption started from the seminal paper by Song et al.
[16], and the goal is to achieve practical efficiency and scalability
with the price of accepting a small leakage.
2
One branch in this research area considers the static setting, in
which the client encrypts the data at the setup phase, and does not
update the ciphertexts on the server side afterwards. In this setting,
Curtmola et al. [17] gave the first reversed-index based scheme
with sub-linear efficiency. Chase and Kamara [18] also proposed a
similar scheme but with higher storage complexity. Cash et al. [9]
proposed a scheme that support boolean queries. Static searchable
encryption, although can achieve sub-linear efficiency, are not
suitable in many application scenarios where updates are required.
Dynamic searchable encryption enables the client to add and
delete data items after the dataset is outsourced to the cloud.
Actually, the work of Song et al. [16] supports dynamically update,
but the search and update require sequential scan performed on
the full-text. Kamara et al. [19] proposed a dynamic searchable
symmetric encryption (DSSE) scheme as an improvement of [17].
Their scheme achieves sub-linear search time but has a high
complexity for the add and delete operations. The scheme also
leaks much more information to the server than [17]. Dong et
al. [20] proposed a dynamic searchable encryption scheme that
supports multiple users. However the scheme is based on public
key cryptography. Kamara and Papamanthou [21] proposed a
parallel DSSE scheme, which leaks less information but require
multiple interactions between the server and client. Sun et al.
[22] proposed a multi-client version of DSSE scheme that support
boolean query. Hahn and Kerschbaum [23] proposed a scheme
that only leaks the search pattern meanwhile achieves linear
searching complexity. Naveed et al. [24] proposed a new primitive
called blind-storage, and based on it, they constructed a DSSE
scheme. Instead of processing and calculating on the data stored
on it, in this scheme, the server just acts as a transmission and
storage entity. It achieves less information leakage but requires
multiple rounds of interaction between the client and server. Gajek
[25] proposed a DSSE scheme based on constrained functional
encryption (CFE), which encodes the index as an encrypted binary
tree and constructed an inner product functionality to traverse the
encrypted tree. Another DSSE scheme with multi-keyword ranked
search was given by Xia et al. [26].
Forward Privacy Roughly, forward privacy requires that a newly
inserted file cannot be matched with previous search queries. This
notion is not applicable to static searchable encryption schemes
because they do not support update. Most dynamic searchable
encryption schemes do not support forward privacy. To date, most
existing forward secure dynamic searchable encryption schemes
are constructed based on ORAM-like structure. Among them,
the conception of forward privacy was firstly precisely stated
by Stefanov et al. [4]. They proposed a forward private DSSE
scheme based on hierarchical ORAM. Likewise, Garg et al. [5]
proposed the first efficient round-optimal oblivious RAM(ORAM)
scheme. As an application of their ORAM scheme, they construct-
ed a DSSE scheme with sub-linear search efficiency meanwhile
concealing the search pattern. The problem of this approach is
the high communication cost that is resulted from using ORAM
like structures. In the scheme of Hoang et al.’s [6], they use a
distributed oblivious data structure that is a distributed encrypted
incidence matrix created on two non-colluding servers. There
are only a few forward private searchable encryption schemes
that do not use ORAM. In the scheme proposed by Chang and
Mitzenmacher [7], forward privacy was achieved by changing
search token after each update. The tokens are unrelated thus to
perform a search the client needs to submit all previous tokens in
the query. The most efficient forward private searchable encryption
scheme was proposed by Bost [8], in which forward privacy is
achieved by using a one-way trapdoor permutation to evolve a
state stored at the client side.
I/O Efficiency of Searchable Encryption Focusing on the prac-
tical performance of searchable encryption, Cash et al. [9] made
a compromise in security and efficiency and proposed a scheme
with good I/O efficiency based on T-Set (a data structure of
keyword-entry tuple). Their method was extended by Cash et al.
[27]. The new scheme has a better performance in both searching
and updating phase. Cash and Tessaro [10] investigated the I/O
efficiency of searchable encryption and proved that it is impossible
to achieve optimal server storage, read efficiency and locality
at the same time due to the security requirement of searchable
encryption. Following the work of Cash and Tessaro, a tight lower
bound of storage locality was given by Asharov et al. [28]. A
tunable SSE scheme was given by Demertzis et al. [29] in which
the locality can be tuned. Recently, Demertzis et al. [30] proposed
a linear-space searchable encryption scheme with constant locality
and sublogarithmic read efficiency. All these schemes are mainly
for the static setting and do not support dynamic update. Miers
et al. [31] came up with a DSSE scheme by adapting ORAM as
oblivious update index(OUI) as an intermediate cache and push a
bucket of document identifiers from OUI to append-only storage
only when that bucket is filled. Their scheme has a higher IO
efficiency compared to original ORAM scheme and achieves a
better locality through the bucket mechanism, but leaks more
information and does not support forward privacy.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Notations
We use r $←− X to denote that an element r is sampled uniformly
at random from a set X , {0, 1}l to denote the set of all l-bit
strings, {0, 1}∗ to denote the set of arbitrary length strings, and
a||b to denote the concatenation of two strings a and b. Let λ be a
security parameter, we say a function ν : N→ R is negligible in λ
if for every positive polynomial p, ν(λ) < 1/p(λ) for sufficiently
large λ. We use poly(λ) and negl(λ) to represent the unspecified
polynomial and negligible functions in λ, respectively. For a set
S, we use |S| to denote S’s cardinality. For a string a, we use |a|
to denote a’s bit length.
3.2 Searchable Encryption
A dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) scheme
enables a client to outsource its data to an untrusted server in
an encrypted form. Later the server can execute search or update
queries on the encrypted data. We only consider the dynamic
setting in this paper because forward privacy is not applicable
to the static setting.
Let a database DB = {(indi,Wi)}Di=1 be a D-vector of
identifier/keyword-set pairs, where indi ∈ {0, 1}l is a document
identifier and Wi ⊆ P({0, 1}∗). The universe of keywords of
the database DB is W = ∪Di=1Wi. We use N =
∑D
i=1 |Wi| to
denote the number of document/keyword pairs. We use DB(w) =
{indi|w ∈ Wi} to denote the set of documents that contain the
keyword w. A DSSE scheme Π = {Setup,Search,Update}
consists of three protocols ran by the client and the server:
• ((K,σ); EDB)← Setup(λ,DB;⊥): It takes a security param-
eter λ and a database DB as inputs and outputs (K,σ) to the
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client and EDB to the server, where K is a secret key, σ is the
client’s state, and EDB is the encrypted database.
• ((σ′,DB(w)); EDB′) ← Search(K,σ,w; EDB): The client’s
input consists of its secret key K , the state σ and a keyword
w, the server’s input is the encrypted database EDB. The
client’s output include a possibly updated state σ′ and DB(w),
i.e. the set of the identifiers of the documents that contain
the keyword w. The server’s output is the possibly updated
encrypted database EDB′.
• (σ′; EDB′) ← Update(K,σ, ind,w, op; EDB): The client’s
input is the secret key K , the state σ, a document identifier ind,
a keyword w and an operation type op. The server’s input is
EDB. The operation op is taken from the set {add, del}, which
means the client wants to add or delete a document/keyword
pair. The client updates its state and the server updates EDB as
requested by the client.
3.3 Security Definition
All existing searchable encryptions schemes leak more or less
some information to the server, as a tradeoff to gain efficiency.
Thus, the security of searchable encryption is defined in the sense
that no more information is leaked than allowed. This is captured
by using the simulation paradigm and providing the simulator a set
of predefined leakage functions L = {LSetup, LSearch, LUpdate}.
Definition 1 (Adaptively Secure Searchable Encryption). Let
Π = (Setup, Search, Update) be a searchable encryption
scheme, A be an adversary, S be a simulator parameterized
with leakage function L = {LSetup, LSearch, LUpdate}. We
define the following two probabilistic experiments:
• RealΠA(λ): A chooses a database DB, the experiment run-
s Setup(λ,DB;⊥) and returns EDB to A. Then, the ad-
versary adaptively chooses queries qi. If qi is a search
query then the experiment answers the query by running
((σi+1,DBi(wi)),EDBi+1)) ← Search(K,σi, qi; EDBi). If
qi is an update query, then the experiment answers the query by
running (σi+1,EDBi+1) ← Update(K,σi, qi; EDBi). Final-
ly, the adversary A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
• IdealΠA,S(λ): A chooses a database DB. Given the leakage
function LSetup(DB), the simulator S generates an encrypted
database EDB← S(LSetup(DB)) and returns it toA. Then, the
adversary adaptively chooses queries qi. If qi is a search query,
the simulator answers the query by running S(LSearch(qi)).
If qi is an update query, the simulator answers the query by
running S(LUpdate(qi)). Finally, the adversary A outputs a bit
b ∈ {0, 1}.
We say Π is an L-adaptively-secure searchable encryption scheme
if for any probabilistic, polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A,
there exists a PPT simulator S such that:
|Pr(RealΠA(λ) = 1)− Pr(IdealΠA,S(λ) = 1)| ≤ negl(λ)
3.4 Leakage Functions and Forward Privacy
A good searchable encryption scheme should reveal as little as
possible information. The leakage is captured by the leakage
functions. Usually we require LSetup = (D,N), i.e. the Setup
protocol only leaks the size of DB and the number of docu-
ment/keyword pairs. For the Search protocol, we usually require
LSearch = (ap, qp), where ap is the access pattern and qp
is the query pattern. More formally, LSearch keeps a history
Hist = {(DBi, qi)}Qi=0, which contains all queries qi so far
and the snapshot of the database DBi corresponding to qi. The
access pattern is defined as ap(Hist) = (t1, . . . , tQ) where ti =
(i,DBi(wi)) if qi = wi is a search query, or ti = (i, opi, indi)
if qi = (indi, wi, opi) is an update query. The query pattern is
defined as qp(w) = {j|qj contains w for each qj in Hist}.
Forward privacy is a strong property regarding the leakage of
update operation in DSSE. Intuitively, it requires that an update
query leaks no information about the updated keyword. The formal
definition is as the following:
Definition 2 (Forward Privacy). An L-adaptively-secure SSE
scheme is forward private if for an update query qi =
(indi, wi, opi), the update leakage function LUpdate(qi) =
(i, opi, indi).
For the convenience of proof, in our definition the update query
contains only one keyword. This definition is actually equivalent to
the one in [8], where the update query contains multiple keywords.
3.5 Searchable Encryption and I/O Efficiency
Scalability is a key consideration when designing a searchable
encryption scheme because the target application is data storage
outsourcing, which usually implies that there is a large amount
of data. Recent searchable encryption schemes are often very
efficient in terms of computation so one consequence is that I/O
efficiency becomes the bottleneck for scaling [9], [10], [31], [29].
The I/O efficiency of searchable encryption is characterized
by three factors: server side index size, the locality and the read
efficiency. The first is self-explanatory. The locality is the number
of non-contiguous reads the server must perform when answering
a search query. High locality means more random access I/O
requests and a longer latency due to the inter-requests latency.
The read efficiency is quantified by the amount of unnecessary or
irrelevant data read. More formally, we have:
Definition 3 (Locality). Let Π be a searchable encryption scheme,
K be a secret key, σ be the client’s state and EDB be a
database encrypted by Π under K with regard to σ. For
every w ∈ W, we say the locality is r for the search query
Search(K,σ,w; EDB) if the server can answer the query by
reading at most r intervals from EDB.
Definition 4 (Read Efficiency). Let Π be a searchable encryption
scheme, K be a secret key, σ be the client’s state and EDB be
a database encrypted by Π underK with regard to σ. For every
w ∈ W, we say the read efficiency is c for the search query
Search(K,σ,w; EDB) if the server can answer the query by
reading at most c · (∑si∈DB(w) |si|) bits.
Cash et al. [10] noticed that the security property has a negative
effect on I/O efficiency and pointed out that, for sake of security,
a searchable encryption scheme must either extend the encrypted
index to an overwhelming large size, or perform searching in a
non-local way (e.g. in a random manner), or read much more bits
than actually needed. Afterwards Bost [8] additionally observed
that locality and forward privacy are two irreconcilable notions.
On the one hand, forward privacy requires that in an update
operation for a keyword w, the locations in the EDB that are
modified should be unrelated to the locations that already known
to match w. On the other hand, to reduce locality, it is necessary
to organize entries in EDB relating to w together so that they
can be read continuously. Bost concluded, which is not entirely
true as we will show later, that under the constraint of forward
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privacy, no locality optimization is possible for keyword w unless
large modification is done to the encrypted database, either during
searches or updates.
4 FAST: FORWARD PRIVATE SYMMETRIC
SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION
In this section, we present FAST, our first forward private search-
able encryption scheme. The main design goal of this scheme
is to eliminate public key operations while retaining optimal
communication complexity.
Recall that a forward private searchable encryption scheme
can be based on ORAM. While ORAM can be purely symmetric
key based [12], [13], [32], [33], [34], it has a large communication
overhead. Therefore, we turned to the state-based approach that
was used in a few existing schemes [7], [8]. The main challenge
of this approach is how to allow the server to re-generate all
previous states (so that communication cost can be reduced), but
not later states (so that forward privacy can be achieved). Sophos
[8] solved this problem by using a public key primitive (trapdoor
permutation), so that the client can evolve the state forward using
a private key and the server can re-generate the whole history
of the states using the public key. However, there exists a huge
gap in adopting this strategy with symmetric key cryptography.
Symmetric key means there is only one key and once it is released
to the server, the server can compute future states and there is no
forward privacy any more. This is why in [7], the client has to
keep the key secret and generate the history of states locally rather
than giving the key to the server and letting the server to generate
the history. However since the query contains the full history of
the state, this results in a huge expansion in the token size and a
large communication overhead.
The idea of FAST is that rather than pseudorandomly gen-
erating all states using a fixed key, the client chooses a random
ephemeral key every time to evolve the state. The current state
is essentially the encryption of the previous state under the
ephemeral key. The ephemeral key is then stored on the server
side, encrypted using the current state. The server can only get the
ephemeral key if it knows the current state. Then by decrypting
the current state with the ephemeral key, the server can derive
the previous state. Iteratively, the server obtains all states, which
enable it to search. Forward privacy is guaranteed since the server
cannot infer unknown states from currently known states and keys,
and the search token size can be made constant because the client
only needs to give the latest state to the server.
Fig. 1 shows the protocols of the scheme. We also depict in
Fig. 2 how the states evolve forward and backward in the update
and search protocols. In the Setup protocol, the client generates
ks and Σ, where ks is a λ-bit long-term key that will be used
to encrypt keywords and Σ is an empty map that will be used
to store the states on the client side. The long-term key ks is
necessary to prevent the server from generating tokens by itself.
The server generates T, which is an empty map to be used to store
the encrypted index. In the Update and the Search protocols, F
is a pseudorandom function, P is a pseudorandom permutation
(and P−1 is the inverse permutation), and h,H1, H2 are secure
hash functions with appropriate output lengths. When updating a
file that contains a keyword w and whose identifier is ind, the
client needs to retrieve the previous state stc from the local state
store Σ (line 5-8), then generates a random ephemeral key kc+1
and evolves the state forward to the current state stc+1 using the
pseudorandom permutation (line 9-11). The ephemeral key kc+1
is not stored on the client side, but is embedded in the encrypted
index entry e that will be stored on the server side (line 12).
The client also generates a reference u from the current state
and the keyword (line 13). The pair (u, e) is sent to the server
and the server updates its map T accordingly (line 15). To search
a keyword w, the client retrieves the current state from Σ and
sends a search token that contains the encrypted keyword and
the current state to the server. Given the current state, the server
needs to generate all previous states sti and find the corresponding
update sequence. In the for loop of the algorithm, the server can
recover the ephemeral key ki (line 26), which can later be used
to recover the previous state (line 36). Because both “add” and
“del” are allowed update operations, the server needs to make sure
not including deleted files in the result set. To do so, the server
maintains a set ∆ that contains deleted file identifiers during the
search process. When the server sees a delete update, the server
puts the file identifier ind into ∆. When the server sees an add
update and the file identifier ind is in ∆, the server removes
ind from ∆. The idea is that the server searches backwards with
regards to the update sequence, therefore ind ∈ ∆ means the
added file later was deleted. So the two operations cancelled, then
ind should be removed from ∆ and should not be added to the
result set. If the server sees an add update and the file identifier is
not in ∆ then the file was not deleted and the identifier is added
to the result set.
Complexity Analysis On the client side, the computational com-
plexity for update and search is O(1). The client stores a λ-bit key
and a map Σ whose size is O(|W|), where |W| is the total number
of keywords. On the server side, the computational complexity
for update is O(1), and for search is O(c) where c is the total
number of updates (add + del) that contains the keyword being
searched since the initialization of the system. The server stores
a map T whose size is O(N) where N is the total number of
document/keyword pairs. The communication complexity is O(1)
for update. For search, the communication complexity is O(1)
for the query and O(|DB(w)|) for the result set, which contains
|DB(w)|matching files. Complexity-wise, FAST is optimal (given
the security constraints).
Security Analysis FAST satisfies the adaptive security definition
(Definition 1). The search query leaks only the access pattern
and query pattern, which is standard in searchable encryption.
The update query leaks no information about the keyword, thus
satisfies forward privacy. We have the following theorem regarding
the security of FAST:
Theorem 1. Let F be a pseudorandom function, P be a
pseudorandom permutation. Let H1 and H2 be two hash
functions modeled as random oracles. Define leakage L =
(LSetup,LSearch,LUpdate) as
LSetup = ⊥
LSearch(w) = (ap(w), qp(w))
LUpdate(i, opi, w, indi) = (i, opi, indi)
Then FAST is a L-adaptively-secure dynamic SSE with for-
ward privacy.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
5 FASTIO: I/O OPTIMIZED SCHEME
In this section, we present FASTIO, our second forward private
searchable encryption scheme. FASTIO retains all good properties
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Setup(λ,⊥;⊥)
Client:
1: ks
$←− {0, 1}λ
2: Σ ← empty map
Server:
3: T← empty map
Update(ks,Σ, ind, w, op; T)
Client:
4: tw ← F (ks, h(w))
5: (stc, c)← Σ[w]
6: if (stc, c) = ⊥ then
7: st0
$←− {0, 1}λ, c← 0
8: end if
9: kc+1
$←− {0, 1}λ
10: stc+1 ← P (kc+1, stc)
11: Σ[w]← (stc+1, c+ 1)
12: e← (ind||op||kc+1)⊕H2(tw||stc+1)
13: u← H1(tw||stc+1)
14: send (u, e) to server
Server:
15: T[u] = e
Search(ks,Σ, w; T)
Client:
16: tw ← F (ks, h(w))
17: (stc, c)← Σ[w]
18: if (stc, c) = ⊥ then
19: return ∅
20: end if
21: send (tw, stc, c) to Server
Server:
22: ID,∆← ∅
23: for i = c to 1 do
24: u← H1(tw||sti)
25: e← T [u]
26: (ind, op, ki)← e⊕H2(tw||sti)
27: if op = “del” then
28: ∆← ∆ ∪ {ind}
29: else if op = “add” then
30: if ind ∈ ∆ then
31: ∆← ∆− ind
32: else
33: ID← ID ∪ {ind}
34: end if
35: end if
36: sti−1 ← P−1(ki, sti)
37: end for
38: send ID to client
Fig. 1: Pseudocode of Protocols in FAST
stc+1
P(kc+1,stc)
stc
H1(tw||stc)
P-1(kc+1,stc+1)st1
H1(tw||st1)
P(k1,st1)
st0 P-1(k1,st1)
k1 kc+1
Update
...
Search
st2
H1(tw||st2)
P-1(k2,st2)
P(k2,st2)
...
k2
P-1
 P 

H2(tw||stc+1)
kc+1 indop
 H1(tw||stc+1)

H2(tw||stc)
kc indop

H2(tw||st2)
k2 indop

H2(tw||st1)
k1 indop
Fig. 2: Update and Search in FAST
of FAST, and has been optimized for I/O efficiency, which enables
it to scale up to very large datasets.
5.1 I/O Deficiencies in FAST
As we discussed earlier, I/O often becomes a bottleneck of
searchable encryption when dealing with large data, therefore it
is necessary to optimize I/O for a searchable encryption scheme.
Although FAST is optimal in terms of complexity and uses only
symmetric primitives, it is poor in I/O efficiency.
Let us compare Sophos and FAST in term of I/O efficiency.
The criteria are the server side index size, read efficiency and
locality. In Sophos, the server side index size is N · l bits where N
is the number of document/keyword pairs in the index and l is the
identifier’s size. This is optimal. To answer a search query with
keyword w, Sophos needs to read c · l bits, where c is the number
of updates that contains w since the initialization of the system.
The read efficiency is 1, which means no unnecessary data is read
and the read efficiency is optimal. The locality of Sophos is c
because the c entries are located randomly in the encrypted index.
In FAST, the server side index size is N · (l+ 1 +λ) bits where λ
is the size of the random ephemeral key and the additional 1 bit is
used to indicate the operation (“add” or “del”). To answer a search
query with keyword w, FAST needs to read c · (l + 1 + λ) bits,
which means the read efficiency is (l + 1 + λ)/l. The locality of
searching a keyword in FAST is c, which is the same as Sophos.
As we can see, in FAST the server side index size and read
efficiency are worse than those in Sophos. And the locality is
as poor as Sophos. Take a closer look, we can find that the I/O
deficiencies in FAST are related to its symmetric key construction.
To use symmetric key primitives, FAST has to store the ephemeral
key in the index. The key size λ is often similar to l, which means
a concrete overhead of 100% or so. However, if we do not store
the key in the index, the server cannot re-generate previous states
and cannot search. The question is: do we have to sacrifice I/O
efficiency for computational efficient (i.e. using symmetric key
primitives)?
5.2 FASTIO: the Idea
FASTIO is our answer to the above question. FASTIO still uses
symmetric key primitives and maintains the same complexities and
security level as FAST. However, it has a much better I/O efficien-
cy. Concretely, the server side index size is at most N · (l+1) bits
and the read efficiency is at most (l + 1)/l. They are very close
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Setup(λ,⊥;⊥)
Client:
1: ks
$←− {0, 1}λ
2: Σ ← empty map
Server:
3: Te,Tc ← empty map
Update(ks,Σ, ind, w, op; Te)
Client:
4: (st, c)← Σ[w]
5: if (st, c) = ⊥ then
6: st
$←− {0, 1}λ
7: c← 0
8: end if
9: u← H1(st||(c+ 1))
10: e← (ind||op)⊕H2(st||(c+ 1))
11: Σ[w]← (st, c+ 1)
12: send (u, e) to server
Server:
13: Te[u] = e
Search(ks,Σ, w; Te,Tc)
Client:
14: (st, c)← Σ[w]
15: if (st, c) = ⊥ then
16: return ⊥
17: end if
18: tw ← F (ks, h(w))
19: if c 6= 0 then
20: kw ← st, st $←− {0, 1}λ
21: Σ[w]← (st, 0)
22: else
23: kw ←⊥
24: end if
25: send (tw, kw, c) to Server
Server:
26: ID← ∅
27: ID.add(Tc[tw])
28: if kw =⊥ then
29: return ID
30: end if
31: for i = 1 to c do
32: ui ← H1(kw||i)
33: (ind, op)← Te[ui]⊕H2(kw||i)
34: if op = “del” then
35: ID← ID− {ind}
36: else if op = “add” then
37: ID← ID ∪ {ind}
38: end if
39: delete Te[ui]
40: end for
41: Tc[tw]← ID
42: send ID to client
Fig. 3: Pseudocode of Protocols in FASTIO
to optimal. More importantly, in FASTIO we reduce the locality
from c to c¯ + 1, where c is the number of updates that contains
w since the initialization of the system and c¯ is the number of
updates that contains w since the last search query. The locality
is optimal for forward private searchable encryption schemes if
we also want to minimize the index size and read efficiency. As
we will see later in the experiment section, the improvement is
significant and FASTIO handles large datasets much better due to
the optimal locality.
Our first key insight is that forward privacy does not require
tracking all previous states. Indeed, forward privacy is defined with
regard to new updates since the last search query. As long as the
new updates are generated using a fresh state, forward privacy can
be achieved. Our second key insight is that re-generating all states
is not necessary for answering search queries. Think recursively:
a search query Qi can be decomposed into two subqueries: (q1)
find all matching documents that were updated before the last
search query Qi−1; (q2) find all matching documents that were
updated after Qi−1. It should be obvious that q1 is essentially
Qi−1. Therefore if the server keeps the result forQi−1, then when
answering Qi, it does not need to answer q1 again. Answering q2
requires only the state after Qi−1, but not the whole history.
By storing the last search query result, we can improve I/O
efficiency significantly. Recall that the poor index size and read
efficiency in FAST is caused by storing the ephemeral keys. If
the server does not need to re-generate states, the client does not
need to store the keys. For locality, because the last search query
result can be stored continuously and can be read altogether in
one go, the overall locality can be reduced significantly. Storing
the last search result does not affect security, because the server
has already known the result. After each search, an adversarial
server can always store the result even though the scheme does
not require so. Therefore explicitly asking the server to store the
result does not give the server any additional advantage.
5.3 The Construction
The protocols of FASTIO can be found in Fig. 3. In the Set-
up protocol, the client generates a long-term key for blinding
keywords, and an empty map Σ for storing states. The server
generates two empty maps, Te is to be used to store the encrypted
index and Tc is to store the last search query results. For each
keyword w, the client stores in Σ two things: a state st that is
generated randomly at the first time w is encountered or after each
search query of w, and a counter c to produce a sub-state for each
update after a search query (until the next search query). Note that
unlike in FAST that the state st must evolve each time an update
is made, in FASTIO st stays unchanged in between two search
queries even though there might be many updates. Although two
updates may be based on the same st, in the Update protocol,
the client can still make them unlinkable by hashing a sub-state
that is the concatenation of st and a counter (line 9 - 12). In the
Search protocol, if there are some documents on the server side
that contain the keyword w, the client generates tw (line 18). The
purpose of tw is to enable the server to find the last search query
result of w in Tc. The client also retrieves the stored state as well
as the counter, and checks whether they should be sent to the
server as part of the search token (line 19 - 25). In this process,
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if the counter c is non-zero, which means there have been updates
since the last search query, then st will be sent to the server and the
client must generate a new random state st and reset the counter
at this point so that future updates can be made unlinkable. If the
counter c is zero, then there is no update since the last search
query and the query result should be the same as the previous
search. Therefore in this case tw alone is enough to retrieve the
result and the client keeps st secret. Search on the server side
consists of two steps. The first step is to retrieve the last search
query result using tw (line 27). Then the server may proceed to the
second step (line 31 - 40). If there have been updates since the last
search query, the server finds all updates using kw (the state) and
the counter. Then the server finds the document identifier from
each update and either removes it from or adds it to the result
set depending on whether the update operation is del or add. The
server also removes the update from Te since its content has been
revealed and is no long secret to the server. After all updates have
been processed, the server returns the result set to the client and
also stores it in Tc (line 41 - 42).
Complexity Analysis Complexity wise, FASTIO is almost the
same as FAST, except that FASTIO has a better server side
computational complexity for answering search queries. On the
client side, the computational complexity for update and search
are both O(1). The client stores a λ-bit key and a map Σ whose
size is O(|W|), where |W| is the total number of keywords. On
the server side, the computational complexity for update is O(1),
and for search is O(c¯) where c¯ is the total number of updates
that contains the keyword being searched since the last search
query. The server stores a map Te and Tc whose size in total is in
the order of O(N) where N is the total number of file/keyword
pairs. The communication complexity is O(1) for update. For
search, the communication complexity is O(1) for the query and
O(|DB(w)|) for the result set, which contains |DB(w)| matching
files.
Security Analysis FASTIO achieves the same security level as
FAST. We have the following theorem regarding the security of
FASTIO:
Theorem 2. Let F be a pseudorandom function, H1 and H2 be
two hash functions modeled as random oracles. Define leakage
functions L = (LSetup,LSearch,LUpdate) as
LSetup = ⊥
LSearch(w) = (ap(w), qp(w))
LUpdate(i, opi, w, indi) = (i, opi, indi)
Then FASTIO is an L-adaptively-secure dynamic SSE with
forward privacy
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
5.4 I/O Efficiency Analysis
FASTIO has a near optimal server side index size and read
efficiency. In FASTIO, the server stores the index in two maps
Te and Tc. In Te, each entry is l + 1 bits where l is the size of
the document identifier. In Tc, each entry is a set of document
identifiers, thus the size is a multiple of l. In total, when there are
N document/keyword pairs, the size of the whole index is between
N · l and N · (l+ 1) bits. To answer each search query, the server
needs to read relevant entries in the index. The server needs to
read in total |DB(w)| document identifier (|DB(w)| is the number
of documents matching the keyword w). In a plaintext search,
the server must read in at least all identifiers of the documents
matching the keyword, which is in total |DB(w)| · l bits. In
FASTIO, some identifiers are read from Te and some are read
from Tc. Entries in Te adds 1 bit overhead per identifier for the
operation type, and entries in Tc have no overhead. Therefore, the
read efficiency of the search query is between 1 and 1 + 1l . In
practice, the document identifiers need to be long enough to be
unique and l is often large, e.g. 128. Then the server side index
size and read efficiency in FASTIO are only less than 1% worse
than optimal.
The locality of FASTIO is optimal under the constraint of
forward privacy. As we have discussed in Section 3.5, locality
and forward privacy are two irreconcilable notions. The impli-
cation is that, as Bost observed, the worst-case locality cannot
be improved unless large modifications is done to the encrypted
database. However, by utilizing the previous search query result,
we can improve the average-case locality. In FASTIO, reading the
previous search query result can be done in one go and if there
have been c¯ new updates after the last search query, additional c¯
non-contiguous reads are needed to complete the search. Therefore
the overall locality is c¯ + 1, which cannot be further improved
without negatively affecting other properties.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of FAST and FASTIO,
and compare the results with Sophos, which is the most efficient
forward private searchable encryption to date.
6.1 Implementation and Experiment Settings
We implemented FAST and FASTIO using C++. For Sophos, we
use the C++ implementation1 by the author. We use Crypto++
library2 for the cryptographic operations: SHA256 for H1 and
H2, and AES-128 for F and P . To make the comparison fair,
in our implementation, we use the same underlying libraries as
in the Sophos implementation: Rocksdb3 for storing key-value
pairs and gRPC4 for communication. The identifier length is set
to 64-bit in all schemes. The server is deployed on an Alibaba
Cloud ECS.i1.xlarge instance located in US West, which has 4
cores (Intel Xeon E5-2682v4, 2.5 GHz), 16GB RAM and 2× 104
GB SSD disks. The client is deployed on a desktop PC located
in China, which has 4 cores (Intel Core i5-3470, 3.7Ghz), 4 GB
RAM and 500 GB hard disk.
6.2 Experiment Results
6.2.1 Update Efficiency
We first show the performance of the update operation. As we
explained earlier, the update operation in Sophos is based on
a public key primitive, while update operations in FAST and
FASTIO are all symmetric key based. We first measured the update
efficiency of FAST, FASTIO and Sophos in a local setting in which
we ran the client and the server on the same cloud instance. In this
setting, the time we measured does not include latency caused
by network, therefore it gives a better picture of the difference in
computational efficiency. We then measured the update efficiency
in a WAN setting, in which the server (in US) and the client (in
China) are distributed. The results are shown in Table 1.
1. https://gitlab.com/sse/sophos
2. https://cryptopp.com
3. http://rocksdb.org
4. http://www.grpc.io
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Fig. 4: Search time per matched document for FAST, FASTIO and Sophos.
As we can see, in the local setting, the throughput of FAST
is about 11×, and FASTIO is about 15×, that of Sophos. In the
WAN setting, the throughput of FAST is about 7×, and FASTIO
about 10×, that of Sophos. The results confirm that FAST and
FASTIO are superior in terms of update efficiency, compared to
public key based Sophos.
FAST FASTIO Sophos
Local Throughput (ops/s) 54060 76100 4890Single update time (ms) 0.018 0.013 0.20
WAN Throughput (ops/s) 21650 31080 2990Single update time (ms) 0.046 0.032 0.334
TABLE 1: Update efficiency for FAST, FASTIO and Sophos
6.2.2 Search Efficiency – Index Processing
For FAST, FASTIO and Sophos, the search operation on the server
side requires processing a list of encrypted index entries to find
matching documents. The search efficiency thus depends crucially
on the efficiency of processing the index. In Fig. 4, we show the
performance of index processing in the three schemes.
We conducted three experiments with different database sizes
14×106, 14×107 and 14×108. In each experiment, we measure
the total time on the server side (i.e. without counting network
latency and token generation time on the client side) for searching
keywords that have 10 − 105 matching documents. We repeat
30 times and take the average, then divide it by the number of
matching documents to get the time for processing a single entry.
As we can see in the figure, the time for processing a single
entry decreases when the number of entries increases. This is
because there is a fixed cost for initializing the search, which
is amortized into the per entry processing time. As the number
of entries increases, the amortized initialization cost becomes less
significant. When the database size is 14 × 106 and 14 × 107,
FAST performs better than FASTIO and Sophos in the cases where
the number of entries is small (10). This is because FAST has a
smaller initialization cost, which is the result of an implementation
level optimization.
We can observe the impact of I/O from Fig. 4. As we can
see, for the same scheme and the same index size, the time we
measured with the largest database (14 × 108) is much higher
than the time we measured with the smaller databases (14 × 106
and 14 × 107). The performance degradation is about 2 orders
of magnitude. The observation is in line with the results from
previous studies (see Section 2). We can also see that FAST was
impacted the most as it has the worst I/O efficiency.
In smaller databases where I/O does not dominates the pro-
cessing time, FASTIO performs much better than Sophos. The
performance difference is about 1 - 2 times. This is mainly because
FASTIO uses only symmetric key operations. In large databases,
the performance difference is not that large, but FASTIO still
performs marginally better than Sophos.
6.2.3 Search Efficiency – Trace Simulation
The experiments in Section 6.2.2 do not fully reflect the search
performance of FASTIO. In fact, it shows the worst-case perfor-
mance of FASTIO. Recall that in FASTIO, the previous search
results are stored to make search more efficient. In order to
see how significant this improvement is, we also simulated the
dynamic setting using traces. We generated 3 traces. Each trace is
a list of update and search queries for a certain keyword. We fixed
the length of the trace to 100,000. Each trace has a parameter α
that is the probability of search queries, i.e. each query in the trace
has a probability of α to be a search query and a probability of
1 − α to be an update query. In the experiment, we let the client
to replay the traces to simulate a real-world setting where updates
and search queries are interleaved. We recorded the total time on
the server side for each search query (from receiving search token
to obtaining the results) in the trace.
In Fig. 5, we show the comparison of search efficiency with
regard to the random traces. We used three different database
sizes and three different query probabilities. In each sub-figure,
the x-axis shows the sequence number of the query in the trace
and the y-axis shows the search time. For FAST and Sophos, the
search time increases almost monotonically in accordance to the
number of update queries performed so far. Recall that in these
two schemes, their indexes contain all entries from all previous
updates. The index entries have to be stored in random locations in
order to ensure forward privacy, this results in the decrease of I/O
efficiency as the locality will increase monotonically. For FASTIO,
as we can see, the search performance is much better, especially
when search is more frequent. The difference is more significant
for large databases. This is because in FASTIO, the index contains
only entries since the last search query. The locality is much better
than in the other two schemes.
In Fig. 6, we show the search time of FASTIO with regard to
the traces. As we can see, despite the large number of updates,
FASTIO’s search time is always kept low. Obviously the more
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Fig. 5: Search efficiency by trace simulation.
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Fig. 6: Trace simulation for FASTIO. Search time is presented in log scale.
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frequent the search queries are performed, the more performance
gain we will see. This suggest that FASTIO has a better scalability,
as frequent updates and large database size has a much less impact
on its search performance than in the other two schemes.
7 CONCLUSION
Designing searchable symmetric encryption is not trivial if we
want to combine efficiency and forward privacy, which are two
irreconcilable properties. In this paper, we designed two forward
private searchable symmetric encryption schemes, both achieve
optimal computational and communicational complexity. As the
first attempt, FAST utilized a state based approach and is compu-
tation friendly for its symmetric construction. Based on the idea
from FAST and utilizing intrinsic leakage, our second construction
FASTIO improves I/O efficiency significantly. Our experiment
results demonstrated that our schemes are efficient and scalable.
Future work and Open questions For static searchable encryp-
tion, Cash et al. [10] gave theoretical bounds of locality, storage,
and read efficiency and showed the relationship between them
and the security notion. For dynamic searchable encryption, the
relationship has not been well-understood and there has not been
any theoretical study to establish the bounds. We would like to
investigate in this direction so that we can understand better the
limit and margin of further performance improvement.
In addition, modern data management system leverage dis-
tributed and parallel architecture to handle large amount of data.
For SSE, search efficiency will sharply drop when the database
is out of the capability of the single machine. In fact, even for
plaintext database, it’s not practical to be deployed on a single
server. We would like to investigate searchable encryption in
distributed and parallel settings.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: We model the two hash functions H1 and H2 as
random oracles. The oracles for H1 and H2 are identical except
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for different output lengths. Each oracle maintains a mapping Hi
that stores input/output pairs (in, out) where in ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
out ∈ {0, 1}` where ` is the the length of the hash function’s
output. Given an input string x, the oracle first checks mapping
Hi, if there is an entry for x then it returns the value associated
with x and terminates here. If there is not an entry for x in Hi, the
oracle randomly picks a string y from {0, 1}`, then stores (x, y)
in Hi and returns y.
We prove through a sequence of games. We start from
RealΠA(λ) and construct a sequence of games that differs slightly
from the previous game and show they are indistinguishable.
Eventually we reach the last game that is IdealΠA,S(λ). By the
transitive property of the indistinguishability, we conclude that
RealΠA(λ) is indistinguishable from Ideal
Π
A,S(λ) and complete
our proof.
Hybrid G1: G1 is the same as RealΠA(λ) except that instead
of generating tw using F , the experiment maintain a mapping
Token to store (h(w), tw) pairs. In the search protocol, when tw
is needed, the experiment first checks whether there is an entry in
Token for h(w), if so returns the entry; otherwise randomly picks
a tw in {0, 1}l and stores the (h(w), tw) pair in Token. It’s trivial
to see that G1 and RealΠA(λ) are indistinguishable, otherwise we
can distinguish a pseudo-random function F and a truly random
function.
Hybrid G2: G2 differs from G1 in two places. Firstly, the
experiment maintains a mapping Key. In the update protocol
(line 9 in Fig. 1), after kc+1 is generated, the experiment stores
(w||(c + 1), kc+1) in Key. Secondly, instead of querying H1 in
the update protocol, a random string is used. The random string is
used to program the random oracle when a search query is issued.
More specially, Instead of doing u ← H1(tw||stc+1), which is
line 13 in the update protocol in Fig. 1, the experiment does the
following:
u
$←− {0, 1}`
L[tw||stc+1]← u
where L is a mapping maintained by the experiment. The second
change is in the search protocol. The following is added after line
20 and line 21 of the search protocol:
for i = 1 to c do
H1[tw||stc+1]← L[tw||stc+1]
ki ← Key[w||i]
sti−1 ← P−1(ki, sti)
end for
where H1 is the table for random oracle H1.
Now G1 and G2 behaves exactly the same except that in
G2, with some probability inconsistency in random oracle query
results can be observed. InG2, H1 is not updated immediately. For
tw||stc+1, the corresponding value u is generated in the update
protocol. However, u is only pushed into H1 when a search query
is issued. After the update with state tw||stc+1, if the adversary
queries H1 with tw||stc+1 before the next search query, it will
get a value u′ such that with a overwhelming probability u′ 6= u
because H1[tw||stc+1] has not been updated and a random string
u′ is chosen by the oracle in this case. If the adversary queries H1
with tw||stc+1 again after the next search query, u will be updated
to the H1 and the query result will be u. If the inconsistency is
observed (we denote this event as Bad), the adversary knows it is
in G2. We have:
Pr[G1 = 1]− Pr[G2 = 1] ≤ Pr[Bad]
Note that the event Bad can only happen if the adversary can
query the oracle with tw||stc+1. Since stc+1 is pseudorandom,
the probability of the adversary choosing stc+1 by chance is
2−λ + negl(λ). A PPT adversary can make at most q1 = poly(λ)
guesses, then Pr[Bad] ≤ q1
2λ
+ q1 · negl(λ). The probability is
negligible and G1 and G2 are indistinguishable.
Hybrid G3: G3 is obtained from G2 in a similar way. In the
update protocol, we replace the line e ← (ind||op||kc+1) ⊕
H2(tw||stc+1) (line 12 in Fig. 1) with the following:
u
$←− {0, 1}l+λ+1
E[tw||stc+1]← u
e← (ind||op||kc+1)⊕ u
where E is a mapping maintained by the experiment. Similarly, the
following is added after line 20 and line 21 of the search protocol:
for i = 1 to c do
H2[tw||stc+1]← E[tw||stc+1]
ki ← Key[w||i]
sti−1 ← P−1(ki, sti)
end for
Using the same argument, we can conclude that G2 and G3
are indistinguishable.
Hybrid G4: In G4, the client side algorithms are changed as
shown in Fig. 7. The main difference between G4 and G3 is that
in G4, st and k is generated on the fly when search is performed.
In G4 a mapping Updates is maintained by the experiment to
record all the update requests since the last search query. Unlike
in G3 where the random oracle query results are chosen according
to tw||stc+1, in G4 the values are chosen randomly without the
knowledge of st (line 4 and 5, Fig. 7). Then when performing a
search, st0 is generated if this the first search query of w (line 12
- 15, Fig. 7). Then ki, sti are generated retrospectively and then
the oracle is updated accordingly (line 21 - 31, Fig 7). The change
however are not observable by the adversary. From the adversary’s
perspectively,G3 andG4 behaves exactly the same: in both games
the update protocol outputs two uniformly random strings, and the
search protocol outputs (tw, kw, c) that has the same distribution
in the two games. Therefore they are perfectly indistinguishable.
Pr[G3 = 1] = Pr[G4 = 1]
IdealΠA,S(λ): in this game, a simulator must generate a view
given only the leakage functions, but not the actual data and
queries. For convenience, in the proof we will use search pattern
and update history instead of using the search leakage function
LSearch(w) directly. The two can be constructed from the leakage
function. The search pattern sp(w) = {j|qj = w in Hist}
reveals which queries in the history are search queries with
regard to w. The update history up(w) = {(j, opj , indj)|qj =
(indj , w, opj) for each qj in Hist} reveals which queries in the
history are update queries with regard to w, as well as the update
types and the document identifiers. We use up>k(w) to denote the
partial update history after the k-th query. It is clear that sp(w) can
be obtained from qp(w) by throwing away all update requests, and
up(w) can be obtained from (ap(w), qp(w)) by combining the
information about update queries. They do not require additional
information beyond what the leakage function allowed.
The simulator S is shown in Fig. 8. The simulator maintains
two mappings for simulating random oracle queries, and a counter
to record the number of updates since the initialization of the
system. For each update query, two random strings are chosen. In
12
Setup()
Client:
1: L,E← empty map
2: v ← 0
Update(ks,Σ, ind, w, op; T)
Client:
3: Append (v + 1, op, ind) to Updates[w]
4: L[v + 1] $←− {0, 1}`
5: E[v + 1] $←− {0, 1}l+λ+1
6: v ← v + 1
7: send (L[v], E[v]) to server
Search(ks,Σ, w; T)
Client:
8: if Token[h(w)] = ⊥ then
9: Token[h(w)] $←− {0, 1}λ
10: end if
11: tw ← Token[h(w)]
12: if Σ[w] = ⊥ then
13: Σ[w]
$←− {0, 1}λ
14: end if
15: st0 ← Σ[w]
16: c = |Updates[w]|
17: [(u0, op0, ind0), ..., (uc, opc, indc)]← Updates[w]
18: if c = 0 then
19: return ∅
20: end if
21: for i = 1 to c do
22: if Key[w||i] 6= ⊥ then
23: ki ← Key[w||i]
24: else
25: ki ← {0, 1}λ
26: Key[w||i]← ki
27: end if
28: sti ← P (ki, sti−1)
29: H1(tw||sti)← L[ui]
30: H2(tw||sti)← E[ui] ⊕ (indi||opi||ki)
31: end for
32: send (tw, stc, c) to Server
Fig. 7: Description of hybrid G4
the search protocol, we use w = min sp(w) to denote the very
first index that w appeared in search pattern. Each w uniquely
identify an unknown keyword w and the simulator can just use
w without knowing w. The token tw is associated with w. The
simulator can use the update history to decide the update queries
with regard to w and their sequence number. Then states and keys
can be generated given the update history. Then the random oracles
are updated. The view produced by the simulator is perfectly
indistinguishable from the one produced in G4.
Pr[IdealΠA,S(λ) = 1] = Pr[G4 = 1]
Summing up, we have
Pr[RealΠA(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealΠA,S(λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ)
S .Setup()
Client:
1: L,E← empty map
2: v ← 0
S .Update()
Client:
3: v ← v + 1
4: L[v] $←− {0, 1}`
5: E[v] $←− {0, 1}l+λ+1
6: send (L[v], E[v]) to Server
S .Search(sp(w), uh(w))
Client:
7: w ← min sp(w)
8: if Token[w] = ⊥ then
9: Token[w] $←− {0, 1}λ
10: end if
11: tw ← Token[w]
12: if Σ[w] = ⊥ then
13: Σ[w]
$←− {0, 1}λ
14: end if
15: st0 ← Σ[w]
16: c = |uh(w)|
17: [(u0, op0, ind0), ..., (uc, opc, indc)]← uh(w)
18: if c = 0 then
19: return ∅
20: end if
21: for i = 1 to c do
22: if Key[w||i] 6= ⊥ then
23: ki ← Key[w||i]
24: else
25: ki
$←− {0, 1}λ
26: Key[w||i]← ki
27: end if
28: sti ← P (ki, sti−1)
29: H1(tw||sti)← L[ui]
30: H2(tw||sti)← E[ui] ⊕ (indi||opi||ki)
31: end for
32: send (tw, stc, c) to Server
Fig. 8: Description of simulator S
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: We model the two hash functions H1 and H2 as
random oracles and prove through a sequence of games.
Hybrid G1: G1 is the same as RealΠA(λ) except that instead
of generating tw using F , the experiment maintain a mapping
Token to store (h(w), tw) pairs. In the search protocol, when tw
is needed, the experiment first checks whether there is an entry in
Token for h(w), if so returns the entry; otherwise randomly picks
a tw in {0, 1}l and stores the (h(w), tw) pair in Token. It’s trivial
to see that G1 and RealΠA(λ) are indistinguishable, otherwise we
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can distinguish a pseudo-random function F and a truly random
function.
Hybrid G2: G2 differs from G1 in that instead of querying H1 in
the update protocol, a random string is used. The random string is
used to program the random oracle when a search query is issued.
More specially, Instead of doing u ← H1(st||(c + 1)), which is
line 9 in the update protocol in Fig. 3, the experiment does the
following:
u
$←− {0, 1}`
UT[st||(c+ 1)]← u
where UT is a mapping maintained by the experiment. The second
change is in the search protocol. The following is added in
between line 19 and line 20 of the search protocol:
for i = 1 to c do
H1[st||i]← UT[st||i]
end for
where H1 is the table for random oracle H1.
Now G1 and G2 behaves exactly the same except that in
G2, with some probability inconsistency in random oracle query
results can be observed. InG2, H1 is not updated immediately. For
st||(c + 1), the corresponding value u is generated in the update
protocol. However, u is only pushed into H1 when a search query
is issued. After the update with state st and counter c + 1, if the
adversary queries H1 with st||(c+1) before the next search query,
it will get a value u′ such that with a overwhelming probability
u′ 6= u because H1[st||(c+1)] has not been updated and a random
string u′ is chosen by the oracle in this case. If the adversary
queries H1 with st||(c + 1) again after the next search query,
u will be updated to the H1 and the query result will be u. If
the inconsistency is observed (we denote this event as Bad), the
adversary knows it is in G2. We have:
Pr[G1 = 1]− Pr[G2 = 1] ≤ Pr[Bad]
Note that the event Bad can only happen if the adversary
can query the oracle with st||(c + 1). Since st $←− {0, 1}λ, the
probability of the adversary choosing st by chance is 2−λ. A
PPT adversary can make at most q1 = poly(λ) guesses, then
Pr[Bad] ≤ q1
2λ
. The probability is negligible and G1 and G2 are
indistinguishable.
Hybrid G3: G3 is obtained from G2 in a similar way. In the
update protocol, we replace the line e← (ind||op)⊕H2(st||(c+
1)) with the following:
u
$←− {0, 1}l+1
E[st||(c+ 1)]← u
e← (ind||op)⊕ u
where E is a mapping maintained by the experiment. Similarly,
the following is added in after line 19 of the search protocol:
for i = 1 to c do
H2[st||i]← E[st||i]
end for
Using the same argument, we can conclude that G2 and G3
are indistinguishable.
Hybrid G4: In G4, the client side protocols are changed as shown
in Fig. 9. The main difference between G4 and G3 is that in
G4, st is generated on the fly when search is performed. In G4 a
mapping Updates is maintained by the experiment to record all the
update requests since the last search query. Unlike inG3 where the
random oracle query results are chosen according to st||(c + 1),
Setup()
Client:
1: UT,E← empty map
2: v ← 0
Update(ks,Σ, ind, w, op; Te)
Client:
1: Append (v + 1, op, ind) to Updates[w]
2: UT[v + 1] $←− {0, 1}`
3: E[v + 1] $←− {0, 1}l+1
4: v ← v + 1
5: send (UT[v], E[v]) to server
Search(ks,Σ, w; Te,Tc)
Client:
6: if Token[h(w)] = ⊥ then
7: Token[h(w)] $←− {0, 1}λ
8: end if
9: tw ← Token[h(w)]
10: if Updates[w] = ⊥ then
11: kw ← ⊥
12: else
13: kw
$←− {0, 1}λ
14: c = |Updates[w]|
15: {(v1, op1, ind1),...,(vc, opc, indc)} ← Updates[w]
16: for 1 ≤ i ≤ c do
17: H1(kw||i)← UT[vi]
18: H2(kw||i)← E[vi] ⊕ (opi||indi)
19: end for
20: end if
21: send (tw, kw, c) to Server
22: Updates[w]← ⊥
Fig. 9: Description of hybrid game G4
in G4 the values are chosen randomly without the knowledge of
st (line 1 and 2, Fig 9). Then when performing a search, kw
(i.e. st) is generated retrospectively and then the oracle is updated
accordingly (line 13 - 19, Fig 9). The change however are not
observable by the adversary. From the adversary’s perspectively,
G3 and G4 behaves exactly the same: in both games the update
protocol outputs two uniformly random strings, and the search
protocol outputs (tw, kw, c) that has the same distribution in the
two games. Therefore they are perfectly indistinguishable
Pr[G3 = 1] = Pr[G4 = 1]
IdealΠA,S(λ): in this game, a simulator must generate a view
given only the leakage functions, but not the actual data and
queries. For convenience, in the proof we will use search pattern
and update history instead of using the search leakage function
LSearch(w) directly. The two can be constructed from the leakage
function. The search pattern sp(w) = {j|qj = w in Hist}
reveals which queries in the history are search queries with
regard to w. The update history up(w) = {(j, opj , indj)|qj =
(indj , w, opj) for each qj in Hist} reveals which queries in the
history are update queries with regard to w, as well as the update
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S .Setup()
Client:
1: UT,E← empty map
2: v ← 0
S .Update()
Client:
3: v ← v + 1
4: UT[v] $←− {0, 1}`
5: E[v] $←− {0, 1}l+1
6: send (L[v], E[v]) to Server
S .Search(sp(w), uh(w))
Client:
7: w ← min sp(w)
8: w ← max sp(w)
9: if Token[w] = ⊥ then
10: Token[w] $←− {0, 1}λ
11: end if
12: tw ← Token[w]
13: if uh>w(w) = ⊥ then
14: kw ← ⊥
15: else
16: kw
$←− {0, 1}λ
17: c← |uh>w(w)|
18: {(v1, op1, ind1),...,(vc, opc, indc)} ← uh>w(w)
19: for 1 ≤ i ≤ c do
20: H1(kw||i)← L[vi]
21: H2(kw||i)← E[vi] ⊕ (opi||indi)
22: end for
23: end if
24: send (kw, tw, c) to Server
Fig. 10: Description of simulator S
types and the document identifiers. We use up>k(w) to denote the
partial update history after the k-th query. It is clear that sp(w) can
be obtained from qp(w) by throwing away all update requests, and
up(w) can be obtained from (ap(w), qp(w)) by combining the
information about update queries. They do not require additional
information beyond what the leakage function allowed.
The simulator S is shown in Fig. 10. The simulator maintains
two mappings for simulating random oracle queries, and a counter
to record the number of updates since the initialization of the
system. For each update query, two random strings are chosen. In
the search protocol, we use w = min sp(w) to denote the very
first index that w appeared in search pattern and w = max sp(w)
to denote the last index that w been searched. Each w uniquely
identify an unknown keyword w and the simulator can just use
w without knowing w. The token tw is associated with w. The
simulator can use the update history to decide whether there have
been new updates since the last search query. If so, a random kw
is generated and the number of updates after the last search query
can be decided given the update history. Then the random oracles
are updated. The view produced by the simulator is perfectly
indistinguishable from the one produced in G4.
Pr[IdealΠA,S(λ) = 1] = Pr[G4 = 1]
Summing up, we have
Pr[RealΠA(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealΠA,S(λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ)
Q.E.D.
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